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The optical acceleration cancelation (OAC) strategy, based on Chapman’s (1968)
analysis of the outfielder problem, has been the dominant account for the control of
running to intercept fly balls approaching head on. According to the OAC strategy,
outfielders will arrive at the interception location just in time to catch the ball when
they keep optical acceleration zero. However, the affordance aspect of this task, that
is, whether or not an approaching fly ball is catchable, is not part of this account.
The present contribution examines whether the scope of the OAC strategy can be
extended to also include the affordance aspect of running to catch a fly ball. This is
done by considering a fielder’s action boundaries (i.e., maximum running velocity and –
acceleration) in the context of the OAC strategy. From this, only when running velocity
is maximal and optical acceleration is non-zero, a fielder would use OAC to perceive
a fly ball as uncatchable. The present contribution puts this hypothesis to the test.
Participants were required to try to intercept fly balls projected along their sagittal plane.
Some fly balls were catchable whereas others were not. Participants were required to
catch as many fly balls as possible and to call ‘no’ when they perceived a fly ball to be
uncatchable. Participants’ running velocity and –acceleration at the moment of calling
‘no’ were examined. Results showed that participants’ running velocity was submaximal
before or while calling ‘no’. Also running acceleration was often submaximal. These
results cannot be explained by the use of OAC in judging catchability and ultimately call
for a new strategy of locomotor control in running to catch a fly ball.
Keywords: Chapman strategy, optical acceleration cancelation strategy, affordances, catchability, fly balls,
baseball, interception, perception and action
INTRODUCTION
Making a catch in baseball is arguably one of the most spectacular ways to gain advantage on the
batting team. Whenever a catch is made, the batter is out and the runners have to tag-up (i.e., touch
their time-of-pitch base), providing the fielding team with a unique strategic advantage. Running
to intercept a fly ball can be a demanding task in which careful locomotor control is required to get
to the right place in the right time to make the catch. A large number of studies have addressed the
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locomotor control involved in catching fly balls. The strategy
most widely accepted to account for the control of running to
catch fly balls that approach head on is the Chapman strategy
(Chapman, 1968; McBeath et al., 1995; McLeod et al., 2002,
2006, 2008; Shaffer and McBeath, 2002; Shaffer et al., 2003, 2008;
Fink et al., 2009). Paradoxically, a hardly addressed issue in this
account of catching fly balls is that of perceived catchability.
Some fly balls are catchable whereas others are not. Catchability
depends on the action boundaries of a fielder (e.g., maximum
running velocity and –acceleration) as well as on the flight
characteristics of a ball (e.g., flight time and –distance). That is
to say, when the ball flight allows enough time for a fielder to
cover the distance to the interception location, the ball would be
catchable. If, however, the fielders’ running capabilities make that
more time is needed to run to that same location, this would yield
the ball uncatchable. Presumably, this affordance of catchability
plays a role in running to catch a fly ball (Fajen, 2007). For
example, if a fly ball is perceived uncatchable, a fielder’s primary
goal might no longer be to make the catch, but to get the ball after
the first bounce. The latter situation requires different timing and
coordination, illustrating that perceived catchability could have a
profound effect on the way locomotion is controlled. In addition,
it might well be the case that fielders will speed up when their
current running speed only just suffices to reach the interception
location (just as shown to be the case in engaging the brake in
driving; see Fajen, 2005a). In this study, we will examine whether
the scope of the Chapman strategy, the dominant account for
the timing of running to catch fly balls, can be extended to
also include the affordance aspects of this task (i.e., perceived
catchability). This will be a first step toward developing an
affordance-based control account (Fajen, 2007) for catching fly
balls.
Chapman (1968) considered the dynamics of running to
catch a fly ball. Although Chapman did consider the forward–
backward as well as the lateral component of running to catch
fly balls, the former has received the most attention, probably
because this component in his analysis determines the timing of
interception. For a ball approaching an outfielder head on, he
showed that the rate of change of the tangent of the elevation
angle α of the ball [i.e., d(tan α)/dt] is constant for the constant
running velocity that would lead a fielder to the right place in
the right time to intercept a fly ball. Deviations from a constant
value of d(tan α)/dt can be corrected for by adjusting locomotor
velocity. An increase in d(tan α)/dt specifies that a fielder’s
current locomotor velocity is such that the ball will fly overhead,
whereas a decrease in d(tan α)/dt specifies that the fielder’s
locomotor velocity is insufficient to reach the landing location
in time. Adjusting locomotor velocity such that d(tan α)/dt
remains constant has become known as the Chapman strategy
(e.g., Chapman, 1968; Michaels and Oudejans, 1992; Dienes and
McLeod, 1993; McLeod and Dienes, 1996; Michaels and Zaal,
2002; Zaal and Michaels, 2003; Kistemaker et al., 2008).
For an outfielder to take advantage of the Chapman strategy,
information related to d(tan α)/dt must be optically available.
That is to say, a fielder must be able to perceive whether his or
her current locomotor efforts are sufficient for keeping constant
d(tan α)/dt. When fielders track the ball with their gaze (see
Oudejans et al., 1999; Postma et al., 2014), the elevation angle
α equals the gaze angle. In this case, gaze angle can be the basis
for using the Chapman strategy. A more general solution, also
useful when gaze is not directed at the ball, can be found in
the optical array (Todd, 1981; cf. Michaels and Oudejans, 1992).
From a fielder’s point of view, the optical position of the ball—
the projection of the ball on a planar projection plane—will rise
at constant speed if d(tan α)/dt is constant. Thus, in essence, the
Chapman strategy amounts to keeping optical velocity constant.
Since keeping optical velocity constant is equivalent to nulling
optical acceleration, the Chapman strategy is also known as the
optical acceleration cancelation (OAC) strategy. If optical velocity
is not constant (i.e., optical acceleration 6= 0), d(tan α)/dt is not
constant either and the fielder must make locomotor adjustments
to make it in time to make the catch. For reasons of consistency,
we will only use the term OAC strategy from here on out.
Empirical studies have shown that fielders’ locomotor patterns
are consistent with the OAC strategy. For successful interception,
fielders have been shown to run in such a way that optical
acceleration equals zero for the largest part of their running
movement (Michaels and Oudejans, 1992; Dienes and McLeod,
1993; McLeod and Dienes, 1996). Fink et al. (2009) consolidated
this finding by showing that locomotor patterns were not merely
coincidental to naturalistic interception of fly balls, but actually
resulted from online visual control of optical acceleration. To
test this, Fink et al. (2009) had participants intercept baseballs
in virtual reality. This allowed the experimenters to perturb the
trajectory of a ball mid-flight. Results showed that participants
corrected for optical acceleration, resulting from perturbations to
the ball trajectory, in order to make the catch. Not only locomotor
behavior appears to be in line with the OAC strategy, also gaze
behavior fits the use of optical acceleration. It has been shown
that participants maintain continuous visual contact with the ball
while running to make a catch, even for balls that fly overhead
(Oudejans et al., 1999; Postma et al., 2014). Such gaze behavior
fits naturally with the use of the OAC strategy, as it implies
continuous visual control of interception.
The OAC strategy is in essence an error-nulling strategy
(McBeath et al., 1995; Fajen, 2005a,b,c, 2007). Nulling optical
acceleration, by adjusting locomotor velocity, will lead a fielder to
the right place in the right time to make a catch. However, nulling
optical acceleration is a condition that is not always possible
to satisfy. The change in optical acceleration that a fielder can
bring about by adjusting running velocity and/or -acceleration is
limited by the locomotor abilities of the fielder. That is to say,
locomotor constraints on part of the fielder, determine whether
optical acceleration can be nulled. This is the problem of action
boundaries (Fajen, 2005a,b,c, 2007). Action boundaries constrain
what one can and cannot do: some fly balls are catchable while
others are not. Fajen (2005a,b,c) argued that people are aware of
their action boundaries and that they act accordingly to control
behavior. As such, behavioral control strategies should not only
be about sufficiency but also about possibility. What lies within
the action boundaries of an actor to attain a certain goal? Or
analogously: what is afforded given the action boundaries of the
actor? Based on this notion, Fajen (2005a,b,c, 2007) developed
the concept of affordance-based control: a novel conceptualization
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of motor control in which affordances, or action possibilities,
rather than error-nulling principles are cardinal to understanding
behavior (for an excellent review on affordance-based control,
please refer to Fajen, 2007).
In the present contribution, we examined whether the OAC
strategy can be made compatible with the concept of affordance-
based control. While the OAC strategy is an error-nulling strategy
and action boundaries have no part in its original formulation,
optical acceleration might still be used in perceiving the
affordance for catchability. From the OAC strategy, catchability
can be observed under two specific conditions. First, if optical
acceleration equals zero, and assuming that a fielder’s current
locomotor velocity can be maintained, the fielder knows that
a fly ball will be catchable. Second, a fielder knows that a fly
ball will be uncatchable when optical acceleration does not equal
zero but locomotor velocity cannot be further increased (either
forward or backward) to cancel out optical acceleration. In this
case, the locomotor qualities of the fielder serve as a constraint
on optical acceleration cancelation, informing the fielder of
(un)catchability. Thus, from the OAC strategy, catchability can
be directly perceived from either one of these aforementioned
conditions.
However, when optical acceleration does not equal zero and
the fielder is not running at maximum speed, optical acceleration
cannot inform about catchability. To appreciate why this is the
case, it is important to understand that there is no one-to-
one relationship between optical acceleration and the locomotor
adjustment required to null the error. This stems from the
fact that optical acceleration is determined by optical position,
which is a function of the position of the fielder relative to the
ball. Optical position follows one-to-one from a specific fielder-
ball geometry. Yet, the reverse is not true: no specific fielder-
ball geometry follows from optical position. To illustrate this,
consider a fly ball approaching a fielder head on. At some point in
time, the fly ball is positioned both 1 m above eye-level and 1 m in
front of the fielder. From this specific fielder-ball geometry, it can
be derived that the angle at which the ball approaches the fielder
is 45◦. Yet, solely from optical position (in this case 45◦), it cannot
be derived that the ball is 1 m in front of the fielder and 1 m above
eye-level. The ball might as well be 10 m up and 10 m away (given
that the optical size of the ball has no part in the OAC strategy).
As such, optical position holds no information about distance,
and hence there are an infinite number of ball positions that give
rise to the same optical position. Consequently and analogously,
the magnitude of optical acceleration holds no information about
the required locomotor adjustment or whether this adjustment is
within the action boundaries of the fielder. Ergo, the affordance
of catchability cannot be directly perceived when the fielder is not
running maximally and optical acceleration is non-zero. From
the OAC strategy, catchability can thus only be perceived under
specific circumstances.
In this study, we examined whether judgments of perceived
catchability would fit the use of the OAC strategy. To test this,
we designed an experiment in which participants were required
to intercept tennis balls projected along their sagittal plane.
Some balls were projected within the locomotor range of the
participant (these were potentially catchable), whereas others
were projected beyond the locomotor range of the participant
(these were uncatchable). Participants were required to intercept
as many fly balls as possible and were instructed to call ‘no’
whenever they felt that a fly ball would be uncatchable. The
kinematic profiles for trials in which a participant called ‘no’ were
studied to establish whether judgments of catchability could have
been based on having reached maximum running velocity and/or




Two women and four men, aged (20–27) volunteered to take part
in the experiment. All participants had considerable experience
in ball sports (at least 11 years), yet none of them had experience
with baseball per se. All participants reported normal or corrected
to normal vision. Prior to the experiment all participants were
informed about the procedure and gave their written informed
consent. The experiment was approved by the Ethics Board of
the Center for Human Movement Sciences (University Medical
Center Groningen, the Netherlands), and the protocol was in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Design
Participants were required to intercept tennis balls projected at
them along their sagittal plane. Tennis balls were projected either
in front of- (front-trials) or behind the initial position of the
participant (back-trials). Some fly balls were catchable (i.e., within
the locomotor range of the participant) whereas others were
uncatchable (i.e., beyond the locomotor range of the participant).
Catchability was manipulated by systematically varying both
flight time (1.64–3.00 s) and projection distance (10–20 m for
front-trials and 20–30 m for back-trials), resulting in 24 ball
trajectories (see below). We aimed at delivering an equal number
of front- and back trials, and to have these sets equivalent in terms
of flight time and passing distance (i.e., the distance between
the initial position of the participant and the landing location of
the ball). The initial position of the participant (20 m from the
site of ball projection) was the same for all trials. Participants
received a total of 96 trials, which were block-randomized over
4 blocks of 24 trials. Participants were encouraged to intercept
as many fly balls as possible and were instructed to call ‘no’ at
the moment that they realized a fly ball to be uncatchable. No
specific instructions were given with regard to catching strategies
(i.e., underhand- or overhand catching). At the start of each
trial, the experimenter verbally cued the participant for ball
delivery.
Setup and Apparatus
The experiment was performed in a large gymnasium
(50 m × 30 m × 10 m). Tennis balls were delivered using
a pitching machine with adjustable pitch and power (Louisville
Slugger, type UPM45 Blue Flame). To realize a range of
projection angles beyond the factory settings of the pitching
machine, it was mounted on a wooden board that could be
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placed at a particular angle using wooden blocks of different
heights. The height of the blocks was such that the machine
could be tilted 10–40◦. We used 24 sets of pitch, power, and
angle combinations in the experiment. Due to slight inherent
variability of the apparatus, ball trajectories at identical apparatus
settings were never exactly the same. As such, the projection
distance could be manipulated with an approximate accuracy of
0.5 m. To prevent visual anticipation of the ball trajectory, the
pitching machine was occluded from sight using a screen.
The experiment was recorded using an HD-camera (Canon
HF100) positioned perpendicular to the plane of ball projection.
The camera was set to its minimal focal length and a ×0.45
wide-angle converter was used to further increase the visual angle
(122◦). The camera was mounted on a tripod and a fast shutter
speed (1/200) was used to prevent motion blur. The experiment
was recorded at a frame rate of 25 frames per second.
Data Analysis
Data from the HD-camera was imported and converted to
∗.MOV files using QuickTime Player (v. 10.3). Video-files were
trimmed down to individual trials. The first frame associated
with ball projection constituted the start of a trial. The end of
a trial was dependent on its outcome (i.e., success or failure).
Trials in which the participant managed to catch or touch the
ball (i.e., success) were digitized up until the moment of first
contact, whereas trials in which the participant failed to catch,
or even touch, the ball (i.e., failure) were digitized up until the
moment the ball hit the floor. Finally, Audacity (v. 1.2.6) was used
to determine if and when a participant called ‘no’.
The planar coordinates of the ball and the participant’s head
were digitized on a frame-to-frame basis (NBody, v.09-13; E.
Otten). Using a planar checkerboard pattern, lens distortion
was calculated and corrected for. The position of the ball was
retrieved by identifying differences between subsequent frames
through subtraction of RGB-values on pixel-level. Differences
between frames were highlighted after all the frames of a trial
were analyzed. From these highlighted regions, the trajectory
of the ball was manually specified. The head position of the
participant was digitized using a custom-made shape recognition
algorithm. Whenever the position of the participant’s head could
not be established automatically the position of the participant’s
head was digitized manually. The digital coordinates of both the
ball and the participant were transformed to real world metrics
using a quaternion. The site of ball projection constituted the
origin of the quaternion with the x-axis extending toward the
participant and the y-axis extending toward the ceiling. The data
were filtered and smoothed for final analysis. A fourth order
polynomial function was used to account for missing values in
the ball data; a cubic spline was used to interpolate and filter the
participant data (smoothing parameter: 0.995).
To assess the running velocity and –acceleration at the
moment of calling ‘no’, kinematic profiles were calculated by
differentiating the participant’s positional data. Subsequently,
kinematic profiles were transformed such that positive values
constituted motion in the direction required to make a catch.
This allowed for direct comparison of running characteristics
of front-trials and back-trials. Additionally, running velocity
and –acceleration at the time of calling ‘no’ were expressed as
a percentage of participants’ maximum running velocity and –
acceleration. For each participant, maximum running velocity
and –acceleration were operationally defined as the highest values
for running velocity and –acceleration over all trials for that
participant (corrected for passing side). Finally, all values were
summarized using probability density plots.
RESULTS
Out of a total of 576 trials, 27 trials were excluded because the
ball hit the ceiling. Furthermore, 36 trials could not be digitized
due to technical difficulties (e.g., irregularities in the background
causing erratic tracking behavior). From the remainder of trials,
only those in which a participant called ‘no’ were selected for
further analysis (n = 218). For these trials, the position of the
ball could be established in 68.7% of all frames, while the position
of the participant could be established in 98.4% of all frames.
Missing values were accounted for as detailed above: for the ball
data a fourth order polynomial spline was used whereas a cubic
spline was used for the participant data. No participants were
excluded from further analysis.
On average, participants caught 50.2% (SD= 9.7%) of the balls
projected at them. Conversely, on average, participants judged
39.8% (SD = 12.9%) of the fly balls projected at them to be
uncatchable. On a small number of trials (M = 5.4%, SD= 3.7%)
participants failed to intercept the ball while not calling ‘no’
either. In the remainder of the trials, the ball hit the ceiling (as
detailed above). It should be noted that participants never called
‘no’ for fly balls that were eventually caught.
The temporal pattern of calling ‘no’ (tno) followed a bell-
shaped distribution (Figure 1A). Participants never took less than
0.8 s to indicate that a fly ball was uncatchable. On average, it
took participants 1.42 s (SD = 0.40 s) to indicate that a fly ball
was judged to be uncatchable. An independent-samples t-test
showed that there was no significant difference [t(216) = −0.70,
p = 0.482, ds = −0.97] in absolute timing of calling ‘no’ for
front-trials (M = 1.41 s, SD = 0.45 s) as compared to back-trials
(M = 1.45 s, SD = 0.36 s). In contrast, a significant effect was
apparent [t(216) = 4.27, p < 0.001, ds = 0.59] when the timing of
calling ‘no’ (t = no) was expressed as a percentage of total flight
time (Figure 1B). Participants judged fly balls to be uncatchable
earlier in ball flight for back-trials (M = 55.5%; SD = 14.1%) as
compared to front-trials (M = 63.8%; SD= 13.9%).
To assess the usefulness of optical acceleration in terms
of catchability, we will turn to the kinematics of the
participants. As discussed before, taking the OAC strategy
as framework, catchability can be judged under one of two
specific circumstances: either optical acceleration equals zero,
indicating that a ball is catchable, or optical acceleration does
not equal zero and the participant is running at his or her
maximum velocity, indicating that a fly ball is uncatchable. To
test whether perceived catchability fits the OAC strategy, we
analyzed participants’ running velocity (and –acceleration) at
the time of calling ‘no’ (tno). The results show that participants
never ran at their maximum velocity at tno (Figure 1C). In
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FIGURE 1 | (A–D) Probability density plots showing the relative likelihood of relevant temporal-spatial characteristics in indicating that a fly ball is perceived to be
uncatchable. The abscissa represents the range of relevant values associated with the variable in question. The ordinate represents probability density values. The
integral of a specific range provides the cumulative probability of value x of property y falling within that range. The integral of a probability density function is always
equal to 1. Probability functions (solid lines) are presented along with a graphical representation of the mean (dashed lines) for front-trials (red lines), back-trials (blue
lines) and, if applicable, all trials (black lines). (A) Represents the probability density function for the absolute timing of calling ‘no’ from trial onset. (B) Represents the
probability density function for the relative timing of calling ‘no’; i.e., expressed as a percentage of the total duration of a trial. (C) Represents the probability density
function for the running velocity when calling ‘no’, expressed as a percentage of maximum velocity. Finally, (D) represents the probability density function for running
acceleration when calling ‘no’, expressed as a percentage of maximum acceleration.
fact, on occasions, participants were even standing still while
calling ‘no’. On average, participants ran at 46.4% (SD = 7.9%)
of their maximum speed when calling ‘no’. An independent-
samples t-test showed that participants exhibited a significantly
[t(216) = −2.14, p = 0.034, ds = −0.30] lower relative running
speed while calling ‘no’ in front-trials (M = 43.3%; SD = 19.1%)
as compared to back-trials (M = 49.4%; SD = 21.8%), see also
Figure 1C. Interestingly, for back-trials, participants occasionally
called ‘no’ while running in the wrong direction (i.e., toward the
site of ball projection), as can be seen from the small negative
peak in Figure 1C.
Rather than maximum running velocity, participants might
also have used maximum acceleration in making perceptual
judgments of catchability. However, the results show that
participants also never accelerated maximally at tno. Participants
were on average decelerating at the moment of calling ‘no’ in
front-trials (M=−4.7%; SD= 18.1%), whereas participants were
on average accelerating in back-trials (M = 4.94%; SD = 19.2%).
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Using an independent-samples t-test, this difference was found
to be significant [t(216) = −3.50, p < 0.001, ds = −0.48], see
also Figure 1D (it is important to note that the kinematic profiles
were transformed such that a positive value for either velocity or
acceleration constitutes motion in the required direction).
Finally, we examined the peak locomotor values (i.e.,
maximum velocity and –acceleration) reached by participants
before calling ‘no’. On average, participants reached a peak
velocity of 54.0% of their maximum running velocity
(SD = 19.1%) and a peak acceleration of 71.2% of their
maximum running acceleration (SD= 15.6%) before calling ‘no’.
Participants rarely reached peak locomotor values greater than
90% of their maximum running velocity (n= 2) or –acceleration
(n = 19), before calling ‘no’ (see also Supplementary Figure 1).
These trials made out only 0.9% and 8.7% respectively of all trials
in which a participant called ‘no’.
DISCUSSION
Making a catch in baseball provides the fielding team with a
unique strategic advantage. In the 1954 World Series, Willie
Mays turned the odds in his favor by successfully intercepting
Vic Wertz’ towering smash. When interviewed about his
performance, Mays stated: “I knew I had the ball all the time”
(Willie Mays Interview – Academy of Achievement, 2017)1. As
such, this memorable play (known as ‘the catch’) was contingent
on Mays’ perception of the affordance of catchability. In this
study, we assessed whether the dominant account for the control
of the forward–backward component of running to catch a fly
ball (i.e., the OAC strategy) can be extended to include the
affordance aspects of intercepting fly balls. Note that several
accounts are available for the lateral component of running to
catch fly balls, and the coupling of the lateral and forward–
backward components (Chapman, 1968; McBeath et al., 1995;
McLeod et al., 2001, 2006; Shaffer et al., 2003; Fink et al., 2009).
Here, we restrict ourselves to the control of forward–backward
running.
Chapman (1968) proposed that the rate of change of the
tangent of the elevation angle of the ball is constant for the
constant running velocity that would lead a fielder to the right
place in the right time. Depending on the distance a fielder has
to cover and the time that is available to do so, this constant
running velocity can take on any value. Running velocity can be
really low for fly balls that are easy to catch and really high for
fly balls that are almost impossible to catch. Yet, in its origin,
the OAC strategy provides no means for separating catchable
from uncatchable fly balls, in part because there is no one-to-
one relation from optical acceleration values to catchability. We
reasoned, however, that the OAC strategy could still work for
perceiving catchability if fielders’ action boundaries are taken into
account (Fajen, 2005a,b,c, 2007; Harrison et al., 2016). From this,
the OAC strategy could still specify the affordance of catchability
under specific circumstances. Either optical acceleration equals
zero, indicating that a fielder will arrive at the right place in the
1http://www.achievement.org/achiever/willie-mays/#interview
right time to make a catch (i.e., the ball is catchable), or optical
acceleration does not equal zero while a fielder is running to the
best of his/her abilities, indicating that a fly ball is uncatchable.
We found, however, that participants’ judgments of uncatchable
fly balls were not confined to these particular circumstances. In
fact, participants rarely ran at maximum velocity or –acceleration
while judging a fly ball to be uncatchable.
Whenever, participants called ‘no’ their running velocity
was often far from maximal; indeed participants could even
be standing still while doing so. The same goes for running
acceleration. Participants were hardly accelerating, or even
decelerating, as they called ‘no’. These findings contrast the
aforementioned prerequisites for perceiving the affordance of
catchability from the use of optical acceleration. One might
argue, however, that the decision to call ‘no’ is not reflective
of the instant that a participant actually perceived a fly
ball to be uncatchable. As such, perceptual judgments might
have resulted from participants already having reached their
locomotor maximum at an earlier moment. Yet, examination of
the kinematic profiles revealed that this was not the case either:
participants hardly ever reached their maximum running velocity
or –acceleration before calling ‘no’. Note that the maximum
velocities and accelerations as determined for every participant
might actually be underestimated. That is to say, we took
their maximum values in the experiment, and it might well be
possible that their actual maximum values were higher when
allowed to run longer distances. Still, even so, the argument
that participants did not reach their maximum running velocity
or –acceleration before calling ‘no’ holds. These findings suggest
that it is unnecessary for fielders to exert, or to have exerted,
maximum locomotor effort when judging the catchability of a fly
ball.
Knowing what one can and cannot do is essential to control of
any type of behavior, including catching fly balls (Fajen, 2005a,b,c,
2007; Harrison et al., 2016). Fajen formalized the concept of
affordance-based control with the task of braking a car to a
safe stop (Fajen, 2005a,b,c, 2007), arguing that affordance aspects
of situations are part of the control of action. In this study,
we advocate affordance-based control and aimed to extend its
principles to the fly ball paradigm. Having established that the
OAC strategy cannot be easily extended to include the affordance
aspects of fly ball catching can be seen as a first step in doing
so. One complication in making the next steps in developing the
affordance-based account is that it is not clear how to characterize
the affordance of catchability. One reason that using the OAC
strategy did not work out very well was that this strategy yields no
information on when an approaching fly ball would be landing
where. This means that the task of identifying the affordance
(i.e., the relation between ball-flight characteristics and player
abilities) is not straightforward from a scientific point of view.
A next step in the hunt for an affordance-based account, thus,
might be an attempt to lay out the variables that combine to
classify some fly balls as catchable and others as uncatchable.
For present purposes, we have worked from the assumption
that the ‘no’-s of our participants were sufficiently accurate.
Understanding how ball-trajectory characteristics combined with
player abilities to yield the affordance of catchability would allow
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us to check this assumption. More importantly, however, it would
possibly guide us to uncovering the information that people
use to perceive the affordance of catchability of approaching
fly balls. Finally, the temporal patterns that we observed when
participants gave their ‘no’-s might prove useful to arrive at a
more precise characterization of the optical variables that they
used. Potentially, the optics at the moment that (or just before)
the moment the participants called ‘no’ can be used to identify
the optical variable. For certain ball trajectories participants were
quick to respond, for others they needed more time. Because we
are able to determine time series of positions of ball and head,
time series of optical variables can be computed. Scrutinizing the
latter time series around the moments of calling ‘no’ might prove
to be the way to uncovering the optical variable that is at the basis
of knowing when a ball is not catchable.
All in all, although the OAC- or Chapman strategy, provides
a parsimonious (and, as such, is the dominant) account for
locomotor control in catching fly balls, it does not appear to be
easily extended to include the affordance aspects of catching a fly
ball. Although our analyses showed this to be necessary for the
OAC strategy to deal with catchability, neither running velocity
nor –acceleration was maximal whilst judging a fly ball to be
uncatchable. As such, the OAC strategy appears to be unable to
explain how the perception of catchability comes to be.
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